The means of economic progress by William McChesney Martin
MY COMMENTS today on economic and
financial developments will be directed
toward the two central problems on which
the nation's efforts should be focused in
1962. One is domestic; the other, inter-
national. The first problem is to move
economic activity higher and unemploy-
ment lower. The second is to strengthen our
position for dealing with the adverse balance
of international payments of the United
States.
For the time being, at least, some of the
requirements for dealing with these two
problems may seem to be in conflict. But
for the long pull, the more basic needs are
the same, because they are the fundamentals
on which all enduring economic growth
must be based.
The prime need is a steady increase in
productive efficiency. But achieving it
carries other requisites. Among them are in-
vestment in new and improved plant and
equipment to turn out better products at
lower costs; savings, to facilitate that in-
vestment; and stability in the value of our
money, to induce those savings.
That, of course, is just part of the chain
reaction that can be set into motion by
progress in meeting these needs.
The surest way to get sales expansion
leading to expansion of output, and output
expansion leading to expansion of job op-
portunities, is to give the consumer a break
by offering him more for his money.
NOTE.—Statement of William McChesney Martin,
Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, Jan. 30, 1962.
In my judgment, much of our postwar
economic trouble has been brought about by
pricing consumers out of the market in-
stead of into it. Increasing our productive
efficiency offers the most promising avenue
for correcting that process by providing a
gain for business and labor to share with
the consumer—as business and labor should
do, in their own long-term interests.
These are matters that seem to me worth
bearing in mind in considering the prob-
lems and performance of the economy, do-
mestic and international, in recent times.
Taken as a whole, 1961 was a year of
vigorous economic advance—happily free
from an accompanying upswing in general
prices, a fact that bolsters prospects for
further growth.
Total economic activity, as measured by
gross national product data, and industrial
production both moved into new high
ground. Gross output rose about 7.5 per
cent from the fourth quarter of 1960, and
8 per cent from 1961's first quarter low.
Industrial production advanced 12 per cent
over the year, and 13 per cent from the
February low. The consumer price index
moved up approximately V2 of 1 per cent,
but wholesale price indexes dipped below
their year-ago levels.
Meanwhile, credit expansion in general
was greater than in any previous year ex-
cept 1959. Funds advanced in credit and
equity markets totaled about $50 billion,
well above the $40 billion of 1960 although
far below the $61 billion of 1959, a year
of record-breaking credit demand. Interest
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rates moved within a relatively narrow
range.
Credit expansion by commercial banks
approximated $15 billion, a record sur-
passed only in 1958, and then by a narrow
margin. Loans accounted for some $6 bil-
lion of that total, although loan demands
were moderate as they usually are in the
early phases of an economic recovery. In-
vestments, also following a characteristic
course, increased about $9 billion.
But even though the number of people
holding jobs rose again to record level,
unemployment failed to respond to general
improvement in demand as rapidly or as
greatly as had been hoped. Not until near
the end of 1961 did unemployment show
an encouraging drop, to about 6 per cent of
the labor force from the 7 per cent level at
which it had held for almost a year. Even
so, the number of long-term unemployed
continued relatively large, totaling about
1.5 million in the seasonally adjusted figures
at the end of the year.
With the rising levels of income and busi-
ness activity now taking place, total em-
ployment should expand further this year
and absorb into gainful activity many of
those currently classified as unemployed as
well as new entrants into the labor force.
To assist this process, we must stay attentive
to changes in the composition of the work-
ing force, a matter to which your Committee
is alert, as demonstrated by the develop-
ment of much pertinent new information
at recent hearings of your Subcommittee on
Economic Statistics.
In 1961, from the recession's February
low to the end of the year, about one million
persons were added to nonfarm payrolls.
This virtually restored the level of nonfarm
employment to the prerecession high. Yet
in manufacturing industries, although em-
ployment in December 1961 was well above
the low point of the previous winter, there
were one-half million fewer factory work-
ers than when the recession began in the
spring of 1960. At the same time, industrial
production was greater than ever before
in our history.
Thus some of the employment patterns
of the recessions and recoveries since 1953
seem to be repeating themselves. After each
recession, total employment has rebounded
to new record levels, but fewer factory
workers have been needed to produce an
increased volume of goods. The decline in
the number of blue-collar job opportunities
even while white-collar job openings were
increasing has been an important factor
causing the rise in persistent unemployment
since 1953. If we are to realize the full
benefits of our increasing productivity, we
must solve the difficult problems of transi-
tion and adjustment for the displaced work-
ers, many of whom lack the skills and
training required in the expanding sectors
of the economy.
The fact that long-term unemployment
has been disturbingly large over the last
decade, even during periods of high-level
activity and rising prices, indicates that the
problem it poses is too complex to be
solved by any single or simple approach.
It is evident that our economy requires
continuing, sustainable growth, attended by
an ever-rising level of over-all demand to
provide an ever-rising number of job op-
portunities for our steadily growing popula-
tion. But it seems equally evident that we
require specific steps to make headway
against the problems posed by certain types
of structural unemployment that are not
readily responsive to general monetary and
fiscal measures. Special programs to in-
crease occupational and geographical mobil-
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ity are necessary for this purpose. Training
and retraining under management, labor,
and Government supervision would greatly
benefit workers who need new skills to
adapt more readily to changing technology.
Both employers and employees would gain
from better provision of information on the
current and prospective job market—that is,
where job openings may be found, and
where qualified workers can be located.
Let me turn now to the second problem
cited at the start. The deficit in the balance
of international payments, although much
reduced from that of the preceding years,
rose again in the last part of 1961.
In the first half of the year, the payments
deficit had shown encouraging shrinkage.
Net sales of gold from U. S. reserves were
only $200 million. The main reasons for
this fairly good result were clear, even at
that time: a low level of imports occasioned
by slack demand because domestic business
activity was low; an advance debt repay-
ment to us, by Germany, of more than half
a billion dollars; and a strengthening of
confidence in the U. S. dollar in the wake
of a declaration by the President that the
Administration was determined to defend
the international value of the dollar.
Nevertheless, it was also clear, even at
the time, that we could not be complacent.
To have the balance of payments in reason-
able equilibrium on the average over a
period of years means that we need to have
a balance of payments surplus, not merely
a reduced deficit, at certain times. The first
half of 1961, when imports were low, was
a time when a payments surplus would have
been appropriate. I do not say that this was
a realistic possibility in 1961. The point
is simply that the good results of the first
half of the year were not good enough,
considering the low level of import demand
at the time.
Balance of payments pressures again
turned adverse in the second half of 1961,
when the deficit began to rise again. Net
sales of gold during the half rose to some
$650 million. They might have gone much
higher if there had not been a big increase
in foreign holdings of dollar reserves, work-
ing balances, and short-term investments in
the United States.
The increase in the over-all payments
deficit in the second half of last year also
had its special causes. Confidence in the
dollar has been well maintained, and that
was not the trouble. The causes of the rise
in the deficit lay elsewhere.
For one thing, imports rose sharply from
their abnormally low level in the first half
of 1961, advancing to levels about in line
with the level reached by the gross national
product in the latter part of the year. Ex-
ports held steady: while those exports
financed by aid programs increased, com-
mercial exports not financed by Government
grants and credit fell short of their mid-1960
level. The failure of commercial exports to
increase in 1961 tied in with the slowing
down last year of European economic ex-
pansion. In Europe, there was an especially
noticeable reduction in buying of materials
and semifinished goods for inventory.
It is quite possible that imports will rise
further, as business activity increases here.
However, we can also fairly expect that
growth in exports will resume. In fact, the
latest export figures, for October and No-
vember, were higher than for any pair of
months earlier last year.
Sooner or later, we need to get a large
increase in our export surplus. To make this
increase in the export surplus come sooner
rather than later, and to make it big enough
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to count, let me emphasize again the neces-
sity that we preserve a competitive climate
of business in this country, raise our pro-
ductivity, hold down costs, and see to it that
our prices are not out of line with those of
other producing countries.
We must also put ourselves into a posi-
tion to negotiate with our principal trading
partners so as to minimize trade barriers
that might otherwise keep us from achieving
this needed increase in our exports. The
task of correcting our balance of payments
deficit would become far more difficult if
the countries in the European Common
Market were to maintain high tariff walls
against our goods while progressively mov-
ing toward free trade within the Common
Market.
In our balance of payments difficulties,
however, exports and imports are not the
whole story. The essence of the problem is
that we have not had a big enough export
surplus to cover our commitments on
economic aid and military expenditures
abroad, and our outflow of private loans and
investments abroad. To cover the deficit,
we have been called on to sell some gold,
and we have had to increase our short-term
liabilities to foreigners. This increase in
short-term liabilities is dependent upon the
willingness of foreigners to build up dollar
reserves, working balances, and short-term
investments in this country. In reality, it
constitutes foreign lending to the United
States. We cannot count forever and without
limit on that sort of lending to support the
position of the U. S. dollar. That is why we
must get a better balance between the ex-
port surplus and our outpayments for eco-
nomic aid, for military expenditures, and
for private capital outflow from the United
States.
In reference to our economic aid com-
mitments and U. S. military expenditures
abroad, let me note that a large part of
aid is being linked to exports, and ways
to obtain offsets for part of the military
expenditures abroad are being sought. We
must continue to make every effort to get
other countries to take} a fair share of the
burden of these costs. Whatever part of
these expenditures cannot be linked or off-
set must be covered by net earnings in
purely commercial trade, investment in-
come, and other private transactions.
So far, I have said very little about private
capital movements, apart from the build-up
of foreign liquid assets in the United States.
One of the big difficulties in the U. S. "balance
of payments in 1961 was that outflows of
long-term and short-term capital were still
very large, even though the kind of volatile
movement we had in the latter part of 1960
was not much in evidence in 1961.
In fact, net outflows of long-term and
short-term capital seem to have been even
larger in the second half of last year than
they were in the first. Here I am talking
mainly about bank loans and acceptance
credits, corporate investments in subsidi-
aries, new foreign issues, and purchases of
outstanding foreign securities that offset
foreign purchases of U. S. corporate securi-
ties. Along with these, there were trade
credits, and also some "movements of
funds" in the sense of acquisitions of liquid
investments or balances abroad, particularly
in Canada.
All told, the net outflow of all the various
types, including a guess for unidentified
movements, seems to have approached $4
billion in the year 1961. This was only
moderately less than the outflow in 1960,
and it was more than the over-all deficit in
our balance of payments in 1961. While the
deficit in the balance of payments cannot
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be related to any one single class of outpay-
ments, clearly the capital outflow was an
important factor.
Restraining these capital outflows is
particularly difficult because they represent
various normal kinds of lending and invest-
ing. These outflows reflect the ready avail-
ability of credit in U. S. markets. Only in
part can they be influenced by the level of
short-term interest rates. By and large, such
differences as did develop last year between
money rates here and abroad do not appear
to have been a primary determinant of
capital movements either from or to the
United States. On the other hand, the ready
availability of credit at rates competitive
with other markets may have exerted an
important influence.
In the circumstances prevailing today,
the Federal Reserve has found it necessary
to balance domestic and international fac-
tors in arriving at policy decisions. The
System's responsibility for the value of the
dollar extends beyond domestic price sta-
bility to the value of the dollar in terms of
gold and of other convertible currencies.
This is partly a matter of restoring basic
equilibrium in the balance of payments, and
partly a matter of preserving stability in
exchange rates in international markets.
Until recently official operations by the
United States to maintain the exchange
value of the dollar have been limited to
purchases and sales of gold by the Treasury's
Stabilization Fund—at $35 an ounce—to
foreign monetary authorities for monetary
purposes. Recent developments, however,
have made it desirable for the United States
to play an active role in exchange markets
themselves.
Persistent deficits in our international
payments have put very large amounts of
dollars into the hands of foreign holders.
This has made the dollar both susceptible
and vulnerable to large and sudden move-
ments of funds. Movements of this kind
can be touched off by international political
uncertainties, or by bearish or bullish re-
ports and rumors about economic and
financial developments at home or abroad.
With the pound sterling and the main other
European currencies again convertible, to
a large extent, funds now can move freely
and in large volume between New York,
London, and the financial centers of con-
tinental Europe.
For these reasons, the Secretary of the
Treasury decided last March to use the
Stabilization Fund for operations in foreign
convertible currencies, for the first time since
the Second World War. The Stabilization
Fund has acquired holdings of some major
European currencies, and undertaken trans-
actions in the market with the aim of de-
fending the dollar from speculative forays.
These operations have been conducted
on a fiscal agency basis by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York for the account of
the Stabilization Fund. The resources of the
Stabilization Fund for these purposes are,
however, quite limited.
The Federal Open Market Committee
and the Board of Governors are fully
cognizant of the increasing importance of
international financial relations for the work-
ing of our domestic monetary system. We
further recognize that, under present-day
conditions, maintenance of an efficient inter-
national payments system based on the
interconvertibility of currencies requires
close cooperation among the central banks
of major industrial countries and with estab-
lished international financial institutions.
As one step in such cooperation, the
System is now prepared in principle and in
accordance with its present statutory au-
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thority to consider holding for its own
account varying amounts of foreign con-
vertible currencies. Towards this end, we are
now exploring, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, methods of con-
ducting foreign exchange operations in con-
vertible currencies with due and full regard
for the foreign financial policy of the United
States.
These System operations, along with
those conducted by the Stabilization Fund,
would have the primary purpose of helping
to safeguard the international position of
the dollar against speculative flows of funds.
They would not and could not serve as sub-
stitutes for more basic action to correct the
deficit in this country's balance of interna-
tional payments.
The problems I have been discussing have
weighed heavily with those of us in the
Federal Reserve in our endeavors over the
last year to keep credit conditions attuned
to national needs.
On the domestic side, to help bring about
recovery, expansion, and sustained growth
in production and employment, the Federal
Reserve has been operating to bolster the
banking system's ability to meet all reason-
able borrowing needs.
On the international side, to help hold
down the outflow of capital and gold
prompted by the continuing balance of pay-
ments deficit, the Federal Reserve has been
operating to minimize drains stemming
from international differentials in interest
rates.
Activities in pursuit of these dual ob-
jectives were carried out in the open market
for U. S. Government securities. Before
taking up these operations, however, I would
like to mention one other recent Federal
Reserve action.
On December 1, the Board and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation an-
nounced an increase in the maximum rates
that banks may pay—if they choose—on
savings and time deposits. The change be-
came effective on January 1 of this year.
In general terms, the action authorized
banks to pay 3Vi per cent on any savings
deposit, and 4 per cent on those left in the
banks for a year or more; also, to pay 3V2
per cent on time deposits with a maturity
of 6 months to 1 year, and 4 per cent on
those with a maturity of a year or longer.
There are some 50 million of these savings
and time accounts in the 6,100 member
banks of the Federal Reserve System alone.
This action was taken after extensive
study and consideration. In arriving at its
decision, the Board was influenced by a
variety of factors. One of considerable
weight was the fact that some short-term
balances were being attracted away from
American banks by higher rates paid on
such balances in other parts of the world,
and that this process contributed, in some
measure, to our continuing balance of pay-
ments problem. Another was the question
of whether there could be any longer any
justification for restricting the rate of interest
that commercial banks may pay on savings
deposits to a level substantially below that
paid by other institutions on similar ac-
counts. Finally, but by no means less im-
portantly, we were concerned over the
longer run impact of a maximum rate that
might limit artificially the rewards received
by small individual savers, whose saving,
as I have said before, plays such an im-
portant role in financing the investment
vital to our economic growth.
The changes that have been made in rates
offered by the banks since the action took
effect have been designed, for the most part,
to encourage genuine saving. If this con-
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tinues to be the case, the result should be
an increase in the volume of funds available
for long-term investment in mortgages, in
State and local securities issued to finance
expanded community facilities, and in
securities issued by business to finance ex-
pansion of productive resources.
Your Committee may be interested in the
results so far of the authorization for pay-
ment of higher rates on savings. Based on a
survey in mid-January of a sizable sample
of Federal Reserve member banks, it ap-
pears that about two-thirds of all member
banks are offering some rate in excess of the
3 per cent maximum rate previously in
effect.
Regular or passbook savings accounts
represent about three-fourths of total time
and savings deposits at member banks.
Some 40 per cent of the banks, holding 70
per cent of total time and savings deposits,
raised their rates on regular savings accounts
above 3 per cent. About half of these banks,
or 20 per cent of the total, went to the newly
authorized 4 per cent for deposits held over
1 year. The other half, generally, are paying
3V2 per cent on savings accounts.
With respect to time certificates of de-
posit and other time deposits, arrangements
vary widely from bank to bank. But many
banks are now offering up to 4 per cent on
1-year certificates, including a sizable num-
ber which have not moved up to the 4 per
cent rate on savings accounts. Rates of 3
to 3V2 per cent are being offered on 6-month
deposits, including the negotiable certificates
offered by many of the larger banks.
Some 60 per cent of the member banks
still pay rates on regular savings accounts of
3 per cent or less. If experience with a
previous change in permitted maximum rates
can be\ used as a guide, any further move
toward increased rates on these accounts is
likely to be gradual, as it was after the
preceding change in 1957.
Now I should like to devote the rest of my
remarks primarily to Federal Reserve opera-
tions in the Government securities market
during 1961.
To assure ready availability of credit in
the American economy, the Federal Reserve
supplied the banking system in 1961 with
reserves in amounts sufficient not only to
offset the credit-tightening effect of gold
drains and currency withdrawals but also
to provide additional reserves to meet re-
quirements against expanding deposits.
Member bank required reserves increased
in 1961 by about $1 billion, while Federal
Reserve holdings of Government securities
increased by $1.5 billion in consequence of
open market purchases. The reserves thus
supplied made possible the near-record ex-
pansion of bank credit in 1961.
As a result of that expansion and of in-
creased financial saving by the public, liquid
assets held by consumers and business in-
creased substantially in 1961. In conse-
quence, the over-all liquidity of the economy
showed an increase about in line with the
expansion in over-all economic activity. Al-
though total liquid assets of the public in-
creased by about 6.5 per cent during 1961—
compared to the 7.5 per cent increase in
gross national product—demand deposits
and currency, the more active elements that
usually are termed the "money supply," in-
creased by only about 3.5 per cent. The pace
of increase in the money supply, however,
accelerated substantially in the latter part
of the year.
The stability that prevailed in interest
rates was one of the striking parts of the
financial scene. Interest rates showed only
a moderate increase in the 1961 business
upturn, just as they had shown only a
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moderate decline during the downturn that
began in the spring of 1960. Accordingly,
since mid-1960 interest rates have moved
within a relatively narrow range well above
the low levels reached in 1958 and below
the high levels reached in late 1959. To
some extent, Federal Reserve policies and
operations, in addition to Treasury opera-
tions, were responsible for this stability.
Although the Federal Reserve supplied re-
serves adequate to enable expansion of bank
credit on the scale earlier described, it sought
to avoid downward pressure on short-term
interest rates. The Treasury, a heavy bor-
rower, obtained most of its new money in
the short-term sector of the market, thereby
putting upward pressure on short-term rates.
Let me note that factors other than official
monetary and debt-management policies
played an important part in keeping the
general level of interest rates during the
1960-61 recession above levels reached in
earlier recessions. These factors included
the mildness of the latest recession and the
large volume of new security issues floated
by corporations and State and local govern-
ments in the first half of 1961. Although
1961 did not witness as great a decline in
interest rates as 1958, neither did it witness
a sharp speculative rise and subsequent fall
in bond prices such as that which charac-
terized 1958.
I should like to add, at this point, some-
thing on the way the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem went about supplying bank reserves.
Because of the nation's international pay-
ments problem, the System sought to pro-
vide these reserves in a manner that would
minimize their effect upon short-term rates,
to which international money flows are
particularly sensitive.
To this end, the Federal Reserve in early
1961 extended the area of its open market
operations to include purchases of longer
term securities as well as short-terms, in
which open market operations formerly had
been confined as a general rule. The pur-
chase of long- instead of short-term securi-
ties, when circumstances warranted, served
at least to relieve the short-term market from
the direct impact of these purchases on
yields, and transfer that direct impact to
the longer term area.
The $1.5 billion addition to Federal Re-
serve holdings of Government securities that
I mentioned earlier reflects merely the net
result of gross transactions totaling vastly
more. Most purchases or sales, in fact, are
made to adjust the availability of bank re-
serves in accordance with temporary varia-
tion in needs, chiefly of seasonal character.
In its gross transactions over the course
of 1961, the Federal Reserve purchased
about $7 billion of Treasury bills and other
issues maturing in less than 2 years, not
including those acquired for brief periods
under repurchase contracts. Over the same
period, it sold or redeemed at maturity a
slightly larger amount of such issues. Pur-
chases of issues maturing within 2 to 5 years
aggregated about $1.5 billion, while pur-
chases of those maturing in over 5 years
amounted to nearly $800 million, nearly all
in the 5-to- 10-year area. Sales of issues in
these groups were negligible. The System
also acquired some securities maturing in
over a year by participating in refunding
offers of such securities in exchange for
maturing issues, but the effect of any such
shifts upon the maturity distribution of the
System portfolio was more than offset by
the approach to maturity of other issues
held.
Treasury purchases of long-term Govern-
ment securities for investment accounts ex-
ceeded in amount those by the Federal Re-
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serve. They were, mostly, of issues maturing
in over 10 years. The Treasury, in addition,
borrowed much of its new money in the
short-term area, thus helping to maintain
short-term interest rates and minimize the
flow of short-term funds abroad.
Most of the purchases of longer term
securities by the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury were made during March, April,
and May, when aggregate new issues of
securities by corporations and by State and
local governments were in heavy volume.
Official (Federal Reserve and Treasury)
operations in that sector of the market
doubtless helped to keep interest rates from
rising in the face of large demands, and to
facilitate the flotation of these corporate,
State, and local issues.
The significance of these operations from
the standpoint of market impact may be
indicated by relating their volume to total
market transactions in each maturity cate-
gory of Government securities. Official mar-
ket purchases of Treasury bills and other
issues maturing in less than 1 year, although
making up the bulk of Federal Reserve
operations, comprised in 1961 only about
4 per cent of total dealer sales of such
securities (excluding those to other dealers).
The proportion for issues maturing in 1 to 5
years averaged 9 per cent for the year, al-
though in some months official purchases
exceeded 30 per cent of dealer sales in this
area. In the 5-to-10-year area, the propor-
tion amounted to more than 20 per cent for
the year as a whole and in the period from
March through July was more than a third
of the total. For securities maturing after
10 years, official purchases comprised over
30 per cent of all market purchases for the
year and nearly two-thirds of total pur-
chases in the second quarter, when the bulk
of the official purchases were made.
In conclusion, I should like to stress that,
along with its problems, 1962 also brings
us opportunities. Foremost among them is
the opportunity to achieve further progress
toward higher economic activity, lower un-
employment, and restored equilibrium in
our international balance of payments.
We can make the most of that oppor-
tunity by working—all of us—to bring
about conditions that will generate the chain
reaction that I described at the outset—a
process that leads from dollar stability to
savings, investment, rising productive ef-
ficiency, lower costs, better prices, greater
buying demand, increased production, and
expanding employment. The prospects for
progress are excellent. Let us apply ourselves
to the realization.
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